

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100050031-1

15 MAY 1979

(FOUO 28/79

1 OF 1

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8460

15 May 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
(FOUO 28/79)



WEST



EUROPE



U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/8460

15 May 1979

TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

(FOUO 28/79)

CONTENTS

PAGE

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Elleinstein Analyzes Divergent Trends in European Communism
(Jean Elleinstein; PARIS MATCH, 20 Apr 79) 1

FRANCE

PSF Militants, Voters' Choices for Leader Analyzed
(L'EXPRESS, 31 Mar 79) 5

The Militants' Choice, by Robert Schneider
French Opinion, by Roland Cayrol

Creation of European Aviation Agency Seen Possible
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 24 Mar 79) 9

Ground Forces Modernization Plans Reviewed
(Michel Carlier; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Apr 79) 11

Public Views on Weapons Sales, Disarmament Reviewed
(Jean Girodet; ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI, Apr 79) 17

DATEX 79 Air Defense Exercise Described
(Jean de Galard; AIR & COSMOS, 14 Apr 79) 24

Briefs

New Politburo Secretary 26
UDF Election Preparations 26

ITALY

PRI Leader Says Conditions Not Ripe for Government With PCI
(Oddo Biasini Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SERA,
24 Apr 79) 27

- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
PSI Directorate Meeting on National Elections (Luigi La Spina; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 24 Apr 79)	30
Turin Paper Examines Sino-Soviet Ideological Antagonism (Frane Barbieri; LA STAMPA, 25 Apr 79)	32
ENEL President Endorses National Energy Conference Proposal (CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 13 Apr 79)	35
SPAIN	
Social Democrats Dominate New Cabinet (CAMBIO 16, 15 Apr 79)	37
Briefs	
New Aircraft for Navy	43

- b -

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ELLEINSTEIN ANALYZES DIVERGENT TRENDS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNISM

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 20 Apr 79 pp 52-53

[Article by Jean Elleinstein: "Berlinguer Gives Marchais a Lesson"]

[Excerpt] The differences between the French Communist Party and the Italian Communist Party are considerable. They are partially explained by different historical situations. But we cannot be satisfied with this superficial evaluation. In fact, there are two radically different political and strategic lines in the communist parties of Western Europe, beyond the diplomatic and sentimental relations which exist between them. Enrico Berlinguer, the PCI secretary general, in his report and his conclusions--like most of the participants--developed the idea of a "third way to socialism"--which is based on the fact that we are in a new historic epoch today, which is no longer that of the period before 1914 when the socialist parties were established, nor that after 1917, where the communist parties were created following the October Revolution.

"We are not speaking about a way intended to stabilize a static point equidistant between East and West, between the countries of the East and the social democracies, but about an innovation" P. Ingrao observes. It is rather a question of a new way to socialism, with all the implications it assumes. It does not eliminate the class struggle--and Enrico Berlinguer states it clearly in his closing speech--but obviously it modifies its forms and content profoundly. The PCI's attitude vis-a-vis Europe is, from this point of view, quite essential and definitely conflicts with that of the PCF. The idea of wanting to substitute the Italian or Spanish model for the Soviet one is far from me, but it is certainly necessary to see the differences, if you want to understand the problems created by Euro-Communism and its major contradictions.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It is on the basis of the seriousness of the economic crises that the Italian and Spanish communists adopt a responsible attitude vis-a-vis economic problems, by pointing out to the workers the needs of the moment and the real opportunities which are offered them, without demagogy of any kind. Enrico Berlinguer reaffirmed this attitude very forcefully, in the same way as Lama, the communist leader of the Italian CGT [General Confederation of Labor].

He also says regarding Europe: "The national European states, taken separately, are too small to successfully cope with new problems. Acting individually, these countries, particularly the weakest ones, are inevitably destined to occupy an inferior position with respect to the great powers and to their economic sphere. It is for this reason that today the development of a process of integration must be perceived as a condition for the real independence of the member countries in the community and for their domestic economic growth. A resumption of the process of integration...involves, in its turn, a real process of democratization of the community, also an increase of the powers of the European Parliament and the creation of a multi-national government." These remarks were taken from Enrico Berlinguer's report to the Fifteenth Congress.

At the same time, Berlinguer demands "a profound revision of the Common [Market] agricultural policy, a new energy policy, a substantial coordination of economic and monetary policy." And he favors an expansion of the Common Market, with the entrance of Spain, Portugal and Greece.

We have there the opposite of the PCF's present policy. In HUMANITE of 6 April, Maxime Gremetz, member of the PCF Politburo declares in fact: "For the Giscard government as well as for the leaders of the socialist party, the European election must be the opportunity for intensifying the supranational and Atlantic trend of its policy." And again: "The objective is a disunited, weakened France submerged in a conglomeration, placed under West German hegemony and the supreme protection of the United States, with the vital decisions for our people made not in Paris, but in Brussels or in Bonn, the French Parliament deprived of its fundamental rights, dismantled, foreign control, the French Army integrated in a European and Atlantic force, cultural colonialization. The proposal for the expansion of the Common Market is the main idea behind this mistaken action."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

I would like to apologize for these long quotations, but they alone make it possible to see in their reality, this contrast in the two strategic policies in the communist movement in Western Europe. The PCF tries to conceal this contrast. But it is necessary to see it in its historic scope: on one hand, Euro-communism based on a historic analysis leading to a third way--a new way to socialism--a modern communism adapted to the situation in the West; on the other hand, a traditional communism closer to the Soviet Union, rejecting Europe, Soviet oriented Gallo-communism. I did not dream up this contradiction for the needs of my explanation. But the subjects mentioned previously indicate it clearly. We could increase them, although the communist parties involved try to minimize it. It is also necessary to draw the conclusions from them.

The European prospects of the Italian and Spanish communists are radically different from those of the French communists. And it is not a case there of an incidental, minor difference which can be overcome. With the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, the situation in Western Europe is going to change--even if the powers of the parliament should not be increased. The mere fact of its existence creates a new situation.

I basically disagree with Michel Debre's analysis in this field, but he is right about the significance of this election, regardless of the precautions taken, the obligations of one and the other. I merely draw contrary conclusions from it. In the contemporary world, if we want to maintain our independence, preserve our democratic institutions and move democratically towards a democratic socialism, we must really develop Europe. It is the convergence of the socialist parties (or social democratic) and of the communist parties which will make it possible to democratize this Europe, make it independent of the big powers and blocs--without it sacrificing, for all that, its alliance with the United States in the framework of the Atlantic Pact. It is what will allow developing new ties with the countries of Eastern Europe, without the latter abandoning the Warsaw Pact. Consequently it does not involve a policy of neutralization. Is it necessary, for all that, to resort to a multinational government, to a more elaborate integration? It is another problem which we can discuss. But the fact that new agricultural, industrial and energy policies are necessary for a Europe threatened with decline, that seems to me to be obvious, just as it is necessary to coordinate all of the economic and monetary policy of the community countries.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Falling back on the mother country can only further our decline. The majority of the French communists do not share this point of view today, which is that of the Italian and Spanish communists. It is not silence about these problems which will eliminate these fundamental differences. One of the main attractions of the Fifteenth PCI Congress is that it has considered them clearly and boldly. It does not seem to me that will be the way followed by the Twenty-third PCF Congress, which will be held next May...

COPYRIGHT: 1979 par Cogedipresse S.A.

8490
CSU: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PSF MILITANTS, VOTERS' CHOICES FOR LEADER ANALYZED

The Militants' Choice

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 31 Mar 79 pp 94-95

[Article by Robert Schneider: "'The Militants' Choice'; You don't change the captain of a winning team. Mitterrand is now sure of his victory at the Metz congress. But what kind of victory will it be?"]

[Text] "I'm still asking: who would have done better than I?" asks Francois Mitterrand, ironically. The 500 socialist militants who crowded into the little Jean-Moulin room in Cogolin (Var) did not find anybody else, either.

Some 48 hours after the Socialist Party's win in the cantonal elections, the first secretary was bringing to an end the marathon campaign that had begun several months earlier within his party. He was now sure of winning at the Metz convention on 6-8 April.

On the evening of 25 March, when the cantonal returns were coming in, one of the people close to him said, "This time, there is no doubt; Mitterrand has won his convention." True, in politics as in sports, you don't change the captain of a winning team. The PS [Socialist Party] was officially crowned the foremost party in France with 26.9 percent of the vote. For the first secretary, it was proof that his platform is the right one: faithfulness to the union of the left, even if the PC [Communist Party] wants to drop it. He also termed it a stinging rebuttal to all those people, even in the PS, who had denounced his so-called no-win strategy.

The convention's arithmetic is also on his side. The section votes put him clearly ahead of Rocard and Mauroy, even if he has little more than a third of the ballots in his own name. With the support of Gaston Defferre's southern votes, he will go over 40 percent and will be in a commanding position at Metz. This is especially true because he has known since the Epinay convention in 1971 how to play the part of high priest at a ceremony that he himself calls "the socialist Easter." He is by turns serious, ironic and prophetic, and will play on the rostrum a' the tunes that the militants like to hear: the history of socialism, the victorious march of the PS, the class struggle, the irreversible break with capitalism, self-management and workers' control. It will be hard for Rocard and Mauroy to break the spell by "talking facts." It will be hard, for example, to remind the convention that the PS wins local elections but loses

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

when national power is at stake. It will be hard to counter reassuring myths with economic rigor. It will even be hard to emphasize that the socialists' progress since the legislative elections can be attributed to the fact that the PS is no longer linked to the PC by a common program.

Will the Metz convention be over before it even begins? Yes, if the final outcome is all that matters. Mitterrand will remain first secretary, barring an overwhelming surprise. It won't be, if you consider the way in which the convention is conducted. How will he win, and with whom? Will it be a landslide victory that will allow him, as he hopes, to shove Rocard aside and choose whether or not he will be the presidential candidate in 1981? Or will it be a narrow victory, good for only one year?

Two Possibilities

Mitterrand has confided to his friends that he would not negotiate with his rivals. They will have to go one way or another depending on their own position. Actually, just as when a coalition government must be formed, the hard bargaining will take place in the smoke-filled room of the resolutions committee among a group of 40 leaders. There, out of sight of the militants, power-brokering will take the place of theoretical controversy. Once again, the ability and experience of Mitterrand should allow him to dominate the meeting.

According to his rivals, five scenarios are possible:

- (1) Isolating Rocard: The alliance with Mauroy and Defferre, or even with CERES [Center for [Socialist] Studies, Research and Education], the party's left-wing minority, would enable Mitterrand to relegate the former leader of the PSU [Unified Socialist Party] to the minority. That is probably the solution he is secretly dreaming of, but Mauroy says he will never abandon Rocard.
- (2) The leftist alliance: This would be with CERES against Mauroy and Rocard. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, leader of the party's left wing, would then be an ally of the first secretary and not a possible challenger in the 1981 presidential race. But this alliance would be incompatible with the PS's desire to increase its center-left constituency. It would also cause serious problems just before the European elections, considering the nationalist positions that CERES has taken.
- (3) Tightrope walking: This would involve a minority government sometimes depending on CERES and sometimes on Mauroy and Rocard. It would be a temporary solution until the 1980 convention.
- (4) The reconciliation of the "big three": This is what Mauroy wants. This is also what Rocard said Tuesday on channel 2, but Mitterrand has refused to listen to this hypothesis so far.
- (5) A holy alliance: This would be a general coming together including CERES, whose presence would make it possible to balance off Mauroy and Rocard on the boards of directors. It would have the advantage of giving a unified image of the party, but it would have the disadvantage of settling neither personal rivalries nor political differences.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The choice of Mitterrand is occasioned by two forthcoming elections: the European elections in June 1979 and the presidential election in 1981. If he succeeds in bringing the Socialist Party further along in June, he may hope to restore his personal image in public opinion (see Roland Cayrol's article). At the same time, no one in his own party will be able to dispute his right to run against Giscard d'Estaing once again.

French Opinion

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 31 Mar 79 pp 94-95

[Article by Roland Cayrol: "French Public Opinion"]

[Text] If the decisions of the Metz convention did not depend on Socialist militants but on PS voters in general, it would be a foregone conclusion: Michel Rocard would win hands down over Francois Mitterrand. The first secretary would even fall behind Pierre Mauroy. For the man who has been shaping the new Socialist Party since 1971, that is the hard lesson of the polls.

In the last poll by IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] (27 February-6 March 1979), Rocard got 52 percent of the favorable opinions; Mitterrand, 46 percent; and Mauroy, 40 percent. The negative opinions went 25 percent against Rocard, 44 percent against Mitterrand, and 23 percent against Mauroy. On the SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] barometer, which aims more at predictability with the question "Would you like to see them play an important role in the months and years to come?" the results are even more favorable to Rocard (48 percent in March) and even to Mauroy (39 percent) than to Mitterrand (35 percent).

Whom does Rocard owe his popularity to? Who are the ingrates who are giving up on Mitterrand?

Women put Rocard on top (43 percent as opposed to only 32 percent for Mauroy and 33 percent for Mitterrand). Rocard also wins in all age groups. The most "Rocardian" are those between 25 and 60. In that age group, one Frenchman in two hopes the Yvelines deputy will have an important future. Among the youngest, 18-24, he is still in the lead (48 percent), but he is not so far ahead of Mitterrand (40 percent). Among people over 65, Rocard still leads (44 percent), but this time Pierre Mauroy is hard on his heels (41 percent).

Socially, too, Rocard leads in all categories, but the differences vary according to social group. The former leader of the PSU wins handily in management and the liberal professions: 59 percent want him to have an important future. He leads Mauroy by 26 points and Mitterrand by 31. Among white-collar workers, which is the group most favorable to the PS, "Rocardism" reaches 55 percent. But Mitterrand (37 percent) and Mauroy (40 percent) show more staying power. Rocard leads Mauroy too among farmers, businessmen, people not in the working force, and retirees.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

There is only one social group in which a decision is still pending; the workers. They put Mitterrand in a tie with Rocard and very slightly ahead of Mauroy. The prestige of the former common candidate of the left in the presidential election remains strongest among the workers, who are also the category most in favor of the union of the left.

The most marked differences between the three men show up in the political nature of the support they receive in public opinion (see graph). Mitterrand's and Mauroy's profiles look the same: high on the left, low on the right. The split is clear. Rocard, on the other hand, scores very highly among the socialists and less well, though still well enough, among the groups to the right and left.

If the three PS leaders are pitted against each other for a future presidential race, Rocard clearly pulls ahead of his rival: 42 percent in the last SOFRES poll (18-24 January) as opposed to 20 percent for Mitterrand. All the tendencies noted above are repeated: the 25-60 year-old age group gives him a clear preference; 66 percent of upper-level managerialials see him as the best PS presidential candidate as opposed to only 9 percent for Mitterrand. Even the workers prefer Rocard (38 percent, as opposed to 22 percent for Mitterrand). Socialist sympathizers do not hesitate: 50 percent for Rocard, 30 percent for Mitterrand. Potential PC [Communist Party] voters lean slightly toward Rocard (32 percent) over Mitterrand (26 percent). The majority still prefer Rocard.

However, the former PSU leader still has not acquired presidential stature. When the French voters are not asked, as did SOFRES, "Who has the best chance of becoming president of the Republic in 1981?" but rather, as did IFOP, "Do you see Mitterrand or Rocard as president of the Republic?" the first secretary, whose ratings are down from September 1978, is still ahead of his rival, who is nonetheless gaining markedly. Pierre Mauroy is a distant third.

A myth must also be dispelled. Michel Rocard did not win everything on the night of 19 March 1978 on channel 2, where he is said to have expressed the feelings of the voters on the left, who were disappointed by their defeat in the legislative elections. A study by Jean-Luc Parodi and Pascal Perrineau, published in the journal PROJET, shows this. Beginning in November 1977, while Mitterrand's popularity is diminishing steadily, Michel Rocard started to rise in public opinion, no doubt because, rightly or wrongly, he symbolized a new way for the left. His rising popularity shot up at the end of 1978. Mauroy, on the other hand, threatened and then passed Mitterrand in early 1979.

Now the country, and especially the left, and most particularly the socialist groups, seem to have doubts about Mitterrand's future, but we must not jump to conclusions. Public opinion is fickle. Francois Mitterrand got a 51 percent favorable rating with IFOP in April 1968, 29 percent in October of the same year and an average of 61 percent in the period from 1974 to 1977.

Picture Caption

The percentage of French voters in each political group who would like to have the three socialist leaders "play an important role in the months and years to come." (SOFRES Barometer, March 1979)
COPYRIGHT: 1979, S.A. Groupe Express

8782

8

CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

CREATION OF EUROPEAN AVIATION AGENCY SEEN POSSIBLE

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 24 Mar 79 p 45

[Article by Jean de Galard: "European Parliament Could Propose Creation of European Aviation Agency"]

[Text] Public hearings on "development of an efficient air traffic control system" were held in Paris early this week by the European Parliament's Regional Policy, Territorial Development, and Transport Commission.

The hearings lasted 2 days during which commission members, European parliamentarians, heard testimony from invited representatives of numerous international organizations and associations including the European Communities, WEU [Western European Union], Eurocontrol, ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization], IATA [International Air Transport Association], IFALPA [International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations], IFATCA [International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Associations], NATO, Council of Europe, ICAA, etc. They presented their detailed views on the major items on the commission's agenda: air traffic control organization, technical advances, labor problems, air traffic management, and cooperation.

We shall discuss this commission's work more fully in a subsequent issue. Designated commission members must now draft a report that will most likely be submitted to the Transport Commission at its next meeting on 2-3 April. This report will then be discussed at a plenary meeting of the European Parliament either on 23-27 April in Strasbourg or on 7-11 May in Luxembourg.

Without wishing to anticipate on the contents of the report to be discussed in plenary session, Lord Bruce of Donington, chairman of the Transport Commission, told a press conference held after the 2 days of hearings that the European Parliament could, within the coming months, propose creation of a European aviation agency similar in organization to the Federal Aviation Administration in the United States. However, when this idea was first introduced at the public hearings, many participants pointed out that "there are many differences between air traffic control conditions in the United States and those in Europe."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The "working conditions" of air traffic controllers were also examined in depth and it was requested that the "heavy responsibilities" borne by controllers be recognized. It was also asked that controllers be granted immunity from legal punishment for on-the-job mistakes. Some voiced the opinion that this principle should be extended to cover pilots also.

The IATA submitted a certain number of observations. Following is the complete text of the IATA comment on "the handling of air traffic."

"The complexity of West European airspace patently calls for a very high degree of international coordination if we expect to use that airspace's capacity efficiently. Unfortunately such coordination still does not exist. As currently organized and managed, the handling of air traffic fails to use a large part of the control capacity. This constitutes the second greatest cause of delays and related problems during peak traffic periods.

"At all operating levels of an air traffic control system, it is necessary to fully exploit that system's potential capacity through efficient, overall, integrated management. Accordingly, the IATA is firmly convinced of the urgent necessity of establishing a centralized tactical system of air traffic management in Europe.

"Immediate steps should be taken, in this connection, to establish coordination between individual national units and integrate them as soon as possible into a centralized system with operational authority. Installation of a centralized system does not do away with the necessity of maintaining control services in certain countries to coordinate national air traffic requirements.

"Given the fact that achieving this indispensable goal will inevitably take time and that each summer operators must cope with a critical situation, organization of a central information system on air traffic handling and flow is obviously an imperative necessity. This new service would be designed to furnish governments and airlines early information on congested areas so as to enable them to seek alternative solutions. In due time, this information service should become an advisory service and ultimately be integrated into the centralized management system for handling air traffic.

"The indispensable prerequisite to achieving these goals is a genuine will to work closely together in Europe. The European Parliament and the Council of Europe could play a most important part by formulating proposals along these lines."

But in this field, as in others, no result can be obtained without the expression of a political will.

COPYRIGHT: AIR & COSMOS, Paris, 1979

8041
CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

GROUND FORCES MODERNIZATION PLANS REVIEWED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Apr 79 pp 26, 27, 76

[Article by Lt Col Michel Carlier: "New Equipment Prospects"]

[Text] Lt Col Michel Carlier is a graduate of Saint-Cyr, "African Earth" class (1957-1959) and is assigned to the Armored Cavalry. He served as unit commander, at schools, and on the staff. A graduate of higher military education courses, he is currently with the research office of EMAT [Ground Forces General Staff]. Ground forces reorganization is being completed. It will however yield its full fruit only after the equipment program now in progress has been carried out, thus giving the ground forces all of the capabilities required by their missions. The 1976 military planning law should therefore permit the ground forces properly to carry out its modernization plan and, by 1985, to have new and competitive equipment expected by the various formations. This desire for upgrading the ground forces will emerge through the succinct description of the principal materiel items which must in short-range or long-range terms be issued to the ground forces units. They are classified according to their function in combat: Fire, mobility, protection, and command.

Fire

Considering the nature of a possibly heavily armored and mechanized adversary, the modernization effort is concentrated mainly on AT fire which would be either direct (tanks, missiles) or indirect (artillery).

The AMX-30 tank is now reaching maturity but progress registered in certain engineering fields necessitates its modernization.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The ground forces have thus decided to improve it in the areas of fire power, mobility, and protection. The AMX-30-B2--because that will be the name of this improved tank--will feature the following improvements.

Automatic fire control, integrating all of the parameters going into firing accuracy, will considerably increase the first-round hit probability, both during the day and at night, since it will be equipped with passive night-time vision instruments permitting firing in poor visibility up to at least 1,000 meters. It could also fire high-performance armor-piercing ammunition (fleche [arrow] ammunition).

Its mobility will be improved by replacing the current gear box with a mechanism box having a longer lifetime and giving it greater agility.

Finally, in the area of protection, the AMX-30-B2 will be able to benefit from progress made since the appearance of new armor plating techniques. In particular it could benefit from a reinforcement of the turret by the addition of front armor.

The first AMX-30-B2 tanks should reach the unit in 1981-1982. They will very considerably upgrade the tank pool, pending the issue of the future tank, the real successor to the AMX-30, for which studies are currently underway.

The AMX-10 RC is the future reconnaissance vehicle of the Light Armored Cavalry and is intended to replace the EBR [Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle] starting in 1980. It combines mobility with fire power (105 [-mm] cannon under the turret). Moreover, it is provided with the latest technical innovations which make it particularly suitable for modern combat, including a laser telemeter connected to an automatic firing control device, light intensifiers, and protection against contamination.

Once it has been placed in service, it will possible considerably to increase the combat capabilities of the Light Armored Cavalry units.

Missiles complete the AT action of the guns. They give the infantry and ALAT [Ground Forces Light Aviation] a very great AT capability.

The MILAN (Light Infantry AT Missile), which replaced the ENTAC [expansion unknown], has already been issued to almost half of the infantry units. The HOT (High Subsonic, Obstacle System, Tube-Launched), with a range of 4,000 meters is to replace the SS-11 mounted on the helicopter. It will later on be mounted on the VAB [Armored Advance Support Vehicle] for issue to certain units specializing in AT combat.

Parallel to this, the performance of ground-to-ground artillery will be considerably improved thanks to the use of high-penetration equipment during the years to come:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The new drawn 155 [-mm] gun which will be issued to the regiments of the infantry divisions;

The 155 Au F1 gun which will be issued to the regiments of the armored divisions and army corps.

The drawn 155 gun will be characterized by its range (24 kilometers) and a rate of fire greater than that of current guns due to a loading accessory. It should also possess certain movement endurance and autonomy enabling the gun to move over short distances only and thus making it easier to move the gun into battery position.

The 155 Au F1 SP gun is also a powerful piece weighing about 43 tons, based on an entirely new design. Its automatic loading system and the use of a combustible shell casing give it great fire power due to a high rate of fire.

These pieces will achieve full effectiveness along with their numerous firing accessories currently under development and permitting the following:

Fast reactions (Atila system);

Trajectory precision (Sirocco tracking equipment and Miradop initial velocity measurement device).

Battlefield surveillance and target acquisition will also be given new impetus due to the issue, within several years, of the Argus system and modern drones. The increase in the rates of fire and in the range, as well as the automation of certain procedures should make it possible to get the most out of this equipment. It remains for us to solve the problem of large-area fire. This gap will have to be filled by the year 1990, using multiple rocket launchers. Equipped with warheads containing mines, grenades, and perhaps projectiles with terminal guidance, this system could give the artillery a very significant supplementary fire power.

Simultaneously we will continue the qualitative improvement of individual fire arms. The French weapon (Famas), using the 5.56-mm cartridge, is intended to replace the submachine gun and the rifle. With an effective range of 300 meters, this weapon will be placed in service as of this year.

Mobility

Along with the increase in fire power we have the requirement for greater mobility which constitutes the essential factor in freedom of action.

Technically and tactically tested in several regiments, the VAB looks like a reliable and promising vehicle. A widely-used tactical transport

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

vehicle, suitable for combat in a nuclear environment, it will be issued to the motorized units and will give them increased mobility while providing them with better protection.

But the improvement of force mobility also necessitates the modernization of crossing equipment and ground mobility support equipment.

Starting in 1985, the Engineers should be able to accomplish their mission of crossing obstacles under good conditions. Indeed, the period of 1980-1990 should mark the disappearance of bridging equipment dating back to the last war and their replacement with modern equipment which can swiftly go into action, which requires only a small crew and which will have a high performance.

This involves the following in particular:

MLF (light crossing equipment), making it possible for light equipment to cross by raft;

MAF (amphibious crossing equipment) which can be used as a class 50 bridge;

and PFM (motorized pontoon bridge).

Support for ground forces mobility however remains one of the major missions of the Engineers.

For this purpose, the Engineer combat units will be issued MPG (multipurpose equipment) (usable as dump truck, loader, and grab-bucket) as well as EBG (armored Engineer utility vehicles), deriving from the AMX-30 family, with scoop, winch, and handling arm.

With regard to night-time vision, the ground forces are trying to benefit from technical progress made so far.

Equipment under study or being developed will furthermore increasingly make it possible to conduct night-time combat operations under conditions close to daytime conditions.

The technique of light intensification (now developed for military use), which consists in amplifying ambient starlight diffused throughout the terrain, will in a few years be joined by heat imagery. This technique makes it possible, in a visual form, to restore the apparent temperature relief of targets which naturally emit IR radiation.

Heat imagery is a particularly high-performance method and is in keeping with the need expressed in the areas of detection and night-time firing of missiles and tanks, night-time piloting of helicopters, and artillery observation.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Protection

This function covers two types of widely differing actions. On the one hand, we have the fight against the conventional actions of the adversary, in particular, his armored and air attacks; on the other hand, we have protection against NBC warfare.

Against this latter type of aggression, the ground forces have a wide selection of detection, warning, and decontamination equipment. Efforts are currently concentrated on individual and group protection and particularly on combat vehicle organization permitting existence and combat operations in a contaminated atmosphere.

To hinder enemy movements, the ground forces will, within a few years, have modern, highly effective and high-performance countermobility means. The Engineer units will progressively be equipped with the following:

Mine digging and distributing equipment operating at a very high rate;

High-performance obstruction and destruction equipment, such as rapid digging equipment and drilling equipment.

But the ground forces, fully aware of the danger from the sky, is making the biggest effort in the area of AA defense.

At medium ranges, the improved Hawk, already permitting more flexible employment than its predecessor, will once again be modernized and its performance will thus be increased.

For short ranges, the Roland weapons system is designed to provide AA defense for ground forces against attacks by low and very-low flying aircraft. Capable of picking up targets at a range of about 10 kilometers, the Roland system can be used up to a range of 6,000 meters and an altitude of 3,000 meters. These equipment items are now gradually being issued to the ground-to-air artillery regiments.

Finally, the overall action of this ground-to-air artillery will be effectively supplemented, at very low altitude, by a self-defense system for units of all arms, organized around the 20-mm cannon, mounted on vehicles (AMX-30, AMX-10) or on a mount.

The combination of these armaments, which will be issued to the units between 1979 and 1985, should reduce the risk incurred by the forward units by assuring immediate protection against air attack for combat equipment as well as the mobile ground-to-air support necessary for maneuvering.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Command

The increase in fire power, force mobility, and all-weather capabilities will lead to an acceleration in the pace of operations but also to a considerable increase in the information volume.

This implies concomitant progress in the conditions for exercising major unit operational command functions.

This improvement was particularly pushed in two areas:

The communications system,

The automation of certain staff functions.

Undergoing experimentation for the past 3 years, the RITA (Integrated Automatic Communications Network) is designed to meet the telecommunications needs of the army corps. Featuring a network structure, it comprises a certain number of junction centers connected to each other by microwave links and equipment for connecting the various CPs. This network makes it possible to establish connections between any point in the system, even in case of destruction of one or more junction centers. Secure and safe, RITA also presents the advantage of being highly mobile and simple to use. It should be placed in service in the first unit starting in 1982.

It remains for us to improve the effectiveness of staff work in order to permit the commander to be up to date at all times regarding the situation. This is the purpose of SACRA (Automated Forward Command and Intelligence System) which is more particularly designed to speed up the exchange, processing, and presentation of information.

Experimentation is underway and this system could be issued to major units starting after 1985. With these two systems, the command will have equipment for keeping up with a particular changing situation and reacting within very short intervals of time.

This brief review is not complete.

Other equipment items are planned, particularly in the fields of intelligence, electronic warfare, and logistics. They will replace or supplement existing equipment.

Thus, by 1985, the ground forces will be equipped with a coherent complex of high-quality equipment. With the help of the planning law, which spells out specific objectives to be attained, most of the notorious inadequacies, in other words, the gaps noted in 1976, will have been remedied, thus permitting the ground forces to have the required operational capabilities.

COPYRIGHT: 1979--Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"

5058
CSO: 3100

16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PUBLIC VIEWS ON WEAPONS SALES, DISARMAMENT REVIEWED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURD'HUI in French Apr 79 pp 12-13, 16

[Article by Col Jean Girodet, chief of the advance unit of the Delegation General for Arms of SIRPA [Information and Public Relations Service of the Armies]]

[Text] The majority of Frenchmen feel that:

--a country's independence rests on its capacity to produce its own arms (63 percent);

--the arms of the French armies are capable of assuring the country's security (57 percent);

--the production of arms by France has positive consequences for:

---France's influence abroad (61 percent),

---the creation of jobs (59 percent),

---the development of scientific research (55 percent).

--France needs outlets abroad to be able to produce the arms necessary for the equipping of its armies under satisfactory economic conditions (66 percent).

The majority of Frenchmen also approve of the principle of France's exporting arms materials to countries having need of them to assure their security (56 percent).

Arms as an Industry

Question: Some persons think that a country's independence rests particularly on its capacity to produce its own arms. Are you in agreement with this opinion?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

--Completely in agreement	33%	}	63%
--Somewhat in agreement	30%		
--Somewhat in disagreement	16%	}	24%
--Completely in disagreement	8%		
--No opinion	13%		

Question: Based on what you know, is France cooperating or not cooperating with foreign countries in the production of arms materials?

--France is cooperating	59%
--France is not cooperating	7%
--No opinion	34%

Question: Do you personally feel that arms production by France has positive or negative consequences for...?

	France's influence abroad	Creation of jobs	Development of scientific research
--Very positive	15%	15%	15%
--Rather positive	46%	44%	40%
--Rather negative	12%	15%	13%
--Very negative	4%	4%	3%
--No opinion	23%	22%	29%

These are the most striking results of a study conducted by the French Public Opinion Institute (IFOP) at the request of the Information and Public Relations Service of the Armies, from 23-29 November 1978. More than 1,000 persons were questioned about French policy in the arms sector and about the Delegation General for Arms.

The breadth of the subjects covered by this study, which touches upon the principal sectors of French political life: Defense, Foreign Affairs, Economy, Industry, Labor and the often impassioned presentation of these matters in the press, led to the supposition when this study was launched that there would be lively reactions on the part of the public in one direction or the other.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

As a matter of fact, the French displayed neither intensive curiosity nor violent rejection. Everything is "reasonable" in the results presented in this article's tables, ranging from the attitude of the French toward the arms industry, the effectiveness of the arms, the equipping of the French armies, the export imperatives, to the perception they have of the Delegation General for Arms and its missions.

It is worth noting that the percentage of Frenchmen who have no opinion varies from 10 to 30, depending upon whether the question does or does not require specific knowledge.

Arms as an Industry

The arms industry is seen by the public as:

--an economic sector apart, not very visible and protected, notably in the present crisis;

--an industry in which the state intervenes;

--an activity which has positive consequences for France's influence abroad and its independence, for the labor market and the scientific sector.

French Army Arms

The French Army, which is seen as capable of assuring the country's security in the eyes of a little more than half of the country, appears to be modern to the same proportion but sufficient in number to only a good third.

The Air Force by far seems to be the best equipped in traditional arms, ahead of the national navy and land army.

In the nuclear sector, the national navy catches up with the air force and even surpasses it slightly (the study was conducted at the time a decision was made to begin construction of a sixth missile-launching nuclear submarine, which was extensively reported by the press). The navy and the air force leave the land army behind them (the absence of "and" vectors in the strategic nuclear forces nuclear forces is doubtless the origin of this perception).

It is more astonishing to note that only one Frenchman out of six thinks that the equipment of the French armies is exclusively national. One Frenchman out of two, however, feels that at least three-fourths of the materials are French. The fact is that almost all our arms materials are French. This erroneous public attitude is due to the persistence of the image of a French Army equipped with American materials during the after World War II (aren't people still talking about the "jeep?"). Therein lies a confusion in the minds of persons which is reflected in the study by the division of 59 percent of the Frenchmen into two nearly equal parts: those who are somewhat in favor and those who are somewhat against the purchase of certain foreign arms to equip the French armies, while 14 percent have no opinion.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

France and Its Arms

Question: Do you personally think that the French Army's arms are...?

a. Modern	56%
Obsolete	26%
No opinion	18%
b. In the process of improvement from the viewpoint of quality of equipment	67%
Or in the process of deterioration from the viewpoint of quality of equipment	10%
No opinion	23%
c. Sufficient in quantity	38%
Or insufficient in quantity	32%
No opinion	30%
d. Capable of assuring the country's security	57%
Or incapable of assuring the country's security	26%
No opinion	17%

Question: Do you think that the French armies are well or poorly equipped in traditional arms (everything except nuclear arms)?

	Land Army	National Navy	Air Force
Well-equipped	50%	55%	66%
Poorly equipped	23%	15%	8%
No opinion	27%	30%	26%

Question: And, as regards nuclear arms, would you say that the French armies are well or poorly equipped?

	Land Army	National Navy	Air Force
Well-equipped	38%	57%	55%
Poorly equipped	23%	11%	10%
No opinion	39%	32%	35%

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Question: The French armies are equipped with French materials?

Totally	8%
Three-fourths	41%
One-half	24%
At least one-half	5%
No opinion	22%

Question: Are you in favor of or against the purchase of certain arms abroad to equip the French Army?

Very much in favor of	7%	} 38%
Somewhat in favor of	31%	
Somewhat against	28%	} 48%
Very much against	20%	
No opinion	14%	

Exports of Arms by France

Question: To be able to produce the arms necessary for the equipping of its Army [as published] under satisfactory economic conditions, do you think that France has or does not have need of foreign outlets?

Has need of foreign outlets	66%
Does not have need of foreign outlets	21%
No opinion	13%

Question: Do you personally approve or disapprove of the principle of France's exporting arms materials to countries which have need of them to assure their security?

Completely approve	25%	} 56%
Somewhat approve	31%	
Somewhat disapprove	14%	} 34%
Completely disapprove	20%	
No opinion	10%	

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Question: Based on what you know, is France now selling arms to all countries which request them or are there countries to which France refuses to sell arms?

France refuses to sell arms to certain countries	51%
France sells to all countries	19%
No opinion	30%

Exports of Arms

The public thoroughly understands that arms exports are an economic necessity and that they involve countries which have need of them to assure their security; i.e., in a way, "on condition" that the arms are to assure their security; moreover, the majority of Frenchmen--and justly so--are convinced that France refuses to sell arms to certain countries.

The Delegation General for Arms [DGA]

One Frenchman out of two recognizes the DGA by its name.

For one Frenchman out of six the acronym "DGA" has a familiar ring.

One Frenchman out of 20 recognizing the acronym "DGA" is able spontaneously to explain exactly what it involves.

These figures are satisfactory to an organization which, because of its nature, has little contact with the public.

The Delegation General for Arms

Question: In your opinion, does or does not the Delegation General for Arms have anything to do with...?

	Construction of Nuclear Submarines	Construction of Nuclear Power Plants	Construction of the "Concorde"
Yes	75%	49%	21%
No	4%	26%	50%
No opinion	21%	25%	29%

The role of the DGA (even if the acronym is not very well known) is quite correctly perceived and in accordance with the real state of affairs; i.e., "The Delegation General for Arms is the only organization in the Ministry of Defense responsible for assuring the realization of all the arms programs. It also has the responsibility for maintaining a modern and effective arms industry in the nation, which is the guarantee of its independence.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

However, the image of the DGA is associated with the nuclear sector in general and not only with the construction of nuclear arms systems which is its responsibility. In this there is an incorrect transfer to the DGA of missions of the Atomic Energy Commission, an independent organization under the Ministry of Industry.

As for the "Concorde," although its construction was handled by the National Industrial Aerospace Company, the direction of the program was taken care of by the DGA.

In conclusion, the results of this survey present a package of opinions which are more realistic than impassioned and an attachment by the people to the manufacture of national arms which they quite properly perceive as having implications going beyond the strict framework of our defense and our borders.

COPYRIGHT: ARMEES D'AUOURD'HUI, Paris, 1979

8143
CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

DATEX 79 AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 14 Apr 79 pp 27, 40

[Article by Jean de Galard: "DATEX 1979: More Than 600 Defensive Sorties"]

[Text] The annual air defense exercise known as DATEX [Territorial Air Defense Exercise] was briefly described in last week's issue. Participants included the French Air Force, French Navy, French Army antiaircraft units, and some foreign air forces.

As in previous exercises, this 1979 version did not have any specific political or strategic setting. Its scenario was based on an air threat appearing alternately from the south and then the north of France.

DATEX 79 had a dual general purpose. First, to evaluate the Air Defense Command's capability of redeploying its forces to cope with an air threat shifting from one direction to another. Second, to assess the ability of air defense units to provide general air cover and defense of key installations of the National Strategic Force in as realistic an environment as possible.

The exercise was conducted on 3-4 April 1979 under unfavorable weather conditions. For air defense headquarters, staffs, and units, DATEX 79 had five objectives:

1. Evaluate the air defense system's ability to cope with an air threat shifting from south to north and requiring rapid redeployment of units in the face of massive enemy air raids penetrating at both low and high altitude with high-performance aircraft in an electronic warfare environment;
2. Evaluate the different echelons of coordination;
3. Train air units: interception of "enemy" high-performance aircraft at high altitude and "enemy" aircraft maneuvering at low altitude over the Mediterranean; operate in an electronic warfare environment; operate from redeployment airfields;

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4. Evaluate redeployed surface-to-air missile units, particularly the Crotale squadron;

5. Activation of ground observer networks at the borders.

Because of weather conditions, only 770 offensive sorties were flown during the 2 days of DATEX 79--1,030 sorties had been planned--and air defense units flew only 606 sorties instead of the 1,000 planned. Thus a total of 1,376 sorties were flown compared with 1,950 in 1977 and 1,906 in 1978.

To ensure that DATEX 79 would be "played" with maximum safety, approximately one-half of the French airspace was reserved exclusively for exercise aircraft each day. This airspace reservation was arranged in conjunction with the Directorate of Air Navigation. Notices about these restrictions were issued long before the exercise. The following measures were taken so as to disturb the population as little as possible: no exercise aircraft were flown at night, except redeployment flights at high altitude the first night; speed was limited to 450 knots per hour on low-altitude flights (minimum altitude of 500 feet); flights over urban centers were prohibited; supersonic flights above land were prohibited below 40,000 feet (10,300 meters); and all high-speed and low-altitude interceptions were conducted over the sea.

The second day of the exercise, General Maurice Saint Cricq, the air force chief of staff, visited the 12th Fighter Wing based at Cambrai and equipped with Mirage F1 aircraft. He also visited Control and Reporting Center 05-922 in Doullens. This center is responsible for detection and early warning in northern France.

During the exercise, a Mirage F1 from the 5th Fighter Wing based in Orange crashed in the department of Indre. The pilot's ejection seat enabled him to parachute safely to earth.

COPYRIGHT: AIR & COSMOS, Paris, 1979

8041

CSO: 3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NEW POLITBURO SECRETARY--A third secretary of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] (after Seguy and Krasucki) will join the PCF's Politburo during its 23d congress. It will be either Rene Lomet, a specialist on immigrants, or Michel Warcolak, in charge of organization. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 27 Apr 79 p 83]

UDF ELECTION PREPARATIONS--The UDF [French Democratic Union] is beginning to prepare possible candidate lists for the legislative elections, in the event that Chirac [should force the calling of early elections]. [Text] [Paris PARIS MATCH in French 27 Apr 79 p 83]

CSO: 3100

26

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

PRI LEADER SAYS CONDITIONS NOT RIPE FOR GOVERNMENT WITH PCI

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 24 Apr 79 p 2 LD

[Interview with Italian Republican Party Secretary Oddo Biasini, by Mario Pendinelli, in Rome: "Conditions Are Not Right for a Government With the PCI"--date not specified]

[Text] Rome--For the republicans this is the first election campaign without La Malfa. Party Secretary Oddo Biasini said: "His death was a serious loss for our country's democracy. For me it was a harsh blow; I lost a mentor and a great friend. It is not enough just to say that we must go on without him. La Malfa taught us that the problems of a modern democracy require continual reassessment and deep consideration; strength and imagination at the same time. In Italy the crisis complicates and aggravates everything. La Malfa, with the battles he waged, often on his own, also taught us this: the parties cannot just pursue votes or concern themselves with easy popularity, on the contrary they should weigh up the problems, study them and propose all-embracing solutions.

Therefore, we will not deviate from our party's fundamental stance in this first campaign without him."

[Question] Mr Biasini, let us look beyond the campaign. The communists are still demanding a part in government and the Christian Democratic Party [DC] still opposes that. What will happen? How will the Republicans behave?

[Answer] I would like to make one thing clear: I do not believe conditions are right for communist participation in the government. That is the Republican position. However, I think it is a mistake to reduce the election campaign to this issue alone--to a sort of referendum on government formulas. The real questions must not be overshadowed--questions which have been dragging on for many years and which are the main cause of the break in this parliamentary term of office. The inflation rate is rising; at the end of 1979 the political forces and social forces will probably have to draw up a much more negative report than expected. The faint signs of recovery achieved with so much difficulty last year already seem to be fading into the past while investments fall

27

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

and unemployment rises. I read countless anxious statements by party and trade union spokesmen on the seriousness of youth and women's questions. There is talk of the state machine collapsing and of an explosive situation in certain regions in the south. But is this discovery of issues on the eve of the elections anything new? I could easily recall the polemics, which became bitter at times, which the Republicans have had to face in recent years just to make people admit the existence of a situation they wanted to hide. However, I prefer to ask the parties, trade unions and employers' federations once again: What do you intend to do to steer the country out of the crisis?

[Question] So you think the elections could serve to solve the problems?

[Answer] They could help if the parties accompanied their lists of problems with precise indications as to how to solve them. If they did, the election campaign could be a series of opportunities for the political parties instead of mere rowdy theatricals; it could be a kind of interval for public consideration of the mistakes made and promises for the future. In a mature civilized country the political parties should confront each other, and if necessary oppose each other, on major issues and not on propaganda slogans. In any case we tried to direct that confrontation to the main issues when the first signs of a government crisis appeared and we issued warnings about the possible traumatic results of this crisis. We did not succeed.

We will stress these issues in the election campaign. We want to understand, and we want the people to be given a clear idea of the parties' views on the 3-year economic development plan, in other words the instrument without which talk about the feminist question, youth unemployment, the south and any other issue is pointless. The economy and the institutions must be reformed. The 3-year plan provides a real way out in the direction of a development anchored to Western society's model and quality of life. It is on these issues and not on abstract disputes that the parties can unite or divide in order to enter government or joint opposition ranks.

[Question] The Republicans have long maintained that they are not prejudiced against the PCI and do not wish to exclude it. However, you maintain that conditions are not right for PCI participation in government. What does that mean? Can you explain your view more clearly?

[Answer] Certainly. We have no abstract prejudices or ideological discrimination against the PCI. However, we have observed that the communists have difficulty in drawing consistent conclusions from Italy's place within the model of Western development. Their concrete political behavior conflicts with the objective of reforming Italian society within the framework of a market economy. However, from that viewpoint the socialist plans are full of uncertainties, too. That was apparent with regard to the 3-year plan and in the Italian Socialist Party's [PSI] attitude when debating and deciding whether Italy should join the European monetary system.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The new PSI line has so far led the socialists to a rediscovery of self-management rather than to a discovery of the market [as published]. Nonetheless, these doubts, inadequacies and anachronisms in the left cannot disguise the fact that in a modern democracy it is impossible to ignore the definition of a proper and constructive relationship with the representatives of large sections of workers. We can be divided on the government and on the majority but some kind of agreement is vital on problems whose solution is crucial to the survival of democracy. Is there really anybody who thinks that terrorism, with its hidden roots, can be eradicated without any contribution from the parties which represent a large section of the working classes? And should we hush up that situation simply because elections are about to be held?

[Question] In short, Mr Biasini, you think the left could be useful for certain things but not for others. Is that what you mean?

[Answer] The question of the next government can only be solved by an agreement between parties which accept, without reservations, Italy's international place in the Western camp and on our country's Western model of development. That is why, as I said before, conditions are not right for PCI participation in the government.

However, if we do not want that to mean a head-on clash which would be really dangerous in such a dire emergency, we must define the relationship between the parties forming the government and the leftwing forces, while distinguishing their respective roles. Some people think that everything can be solved by secret agreements, mutual favors and drawing lots for the various posts. We resolutely oppose such a view.

We think that there should be open confrontation on the urgent problems and on the crisis which is evolving more rapidly than the parties. We do not want the left to have an alibi for avoiding its responsibilities.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.

CSO: 3104

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ITALY

PSI DIRECTORATE MEETING ON NATIONAL ELECTIONS

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 24 Apr 79 p 2 LD

[Report by Luigi La Spina on Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 23 April directorate meeting in Rome: "PSI Reproposes Alliance With Christian Democratic Party (DC), But on an Equal Footing"]

[Text] Rome--Only "under conditions of parity" will the socialists return to government cooperation with the DC. This is the election outlook that Craxi implied yesterday for the post-election period, deliberately using the generic term "various forms" to describe the specific nature of the "parity." Be that as it may, the plan that the socialist secretary has been hatching for some time and which will probably constitute his main rallying point in the next government crisis, is for a socialist prime minister. Whatever happens, the desired solution will have to "move toward a serious recovery of national unity."

Both the communists--during and since their congress--and the Christian Democrats--at their recent national council meeting--have been urging the PSI to clearly indicate their specific objective, that is the government formula for which the party would be fighting in the election campaign. This is why the attention of the political world centered yesterday on the debate by the PSI directorate, which, having spent all day defining its political line, postponed the question of candidatures to 26 and 27 April.

In Craxi's opinion, "the bipolar tendency which gave the vast majority of votes to the DC and the PCI" constitutes the main reason for the Italian political crisis. On the one hand, the DC "has no right to demand a continuation of its own hegemony" and therefore "must be placed in a different position." On the other hand, it is true that "the aspiration to a socialist and leftwing alternative is still a very widespread demand, but "the indispensable conditions demanded for such an alternative do not yet fully exist."

Essentially, the socialist secretary believes that only after a "rebalancing of forces" within the left, between the PCI and the PSI, will it realistically be possible to attain the general objective of the alternative.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Craxi's political approach found an immediate opponent in Lombardi. The old leftwing leader acknowledged "the improbability of a victory" for an immediate proposal of a leftwing alternative. In his opinion, however, this outlook must not lead to a shelving of the plan, to whose attainment, indeed, "the various tactics and even the admittedly necessary compromises" must be coherently directed. This is why equidistance between the DC and the PCI must be avoided, "on account of the DC's unquestionably greater responsibilities."

The subsequent speeches at the directorate meeting provided a somewhat variegated range of opinions, albeit with a shared foundation which, at the close, permitted the approval of a document with just one vote against-- from Achilli.

[Former secretary] De Martino, for instance, shared Craxi's criticism of the bipolarism, but stated that the "unitary ties" with the PCI must be strengthened. He believes that the socialists must therefore state clearly that they are "in favor of the communists' presence in a government of democratic unity."

Landolfi was of entirely the opposite opinion. This representative of the Mancini faction claimed that "it is not productive to conduct an election campaign centered on the issue of the PCI's entry into government. There would be a danger of obscuring the PSI's autonomous identity."

According to Querci, however, the aim of strengthening the PSI "cannot be taken up if we propose the national unity policy in old forms." In his opinion, the primary responsibility for the crisis lies with the DC and within the national unity policy "the left must be in a position to express its own autonomous government capability." This stance was expressed much more emphatically by Achilli who, as stated above, was the only directorate member to vote against the document, which will be published today.

The last speakers in the evening were Martelli, who maintained, among other things, that the rebalancing between the PCI and PSI "could bring about the resumption of the process of Eurocommunism, which has been halted," and De Michelis, who stressed the need to "reject the exhumation of the center-left."

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.

CSO: 3104

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

TURIN PAPER EXAMINES SINO-SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL ANTAGONISM

Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 25 Apr 79 pp 1-2 LD

[Article by Frane Barbieri: "Moscow: The Document That Indicates China as the 'Principal Enemy'"]

[Text] Berlinguer has expressed with regard to Chinese policy his "concern at the attitude of regarding the USSR as an enemy--and, what's more, the principal enemy." The Eurocommunist leader could have made the same objection, using slightly different arguments, about Soviet policy. Be that as it may, the Chinese leaders make no mystery of a similar "attitude" on their own part. A while ago I also had a chance to hear an interpretation of this topic from one of the unnumerable delegations which Beijing sends round the world. According to the Chinese, capitalism is dying or transforming itself, giving birth to social and national revolutions. Discovering the world after long years of self-isolation, the Chinese delegations find it difficult to hide their surprises. Their two most important surprises are as follows: the high degree of industrial organization and the level of nationalization and state control in the developed countries.

If not exactly as a paper tiger, the Chinese see capitalism as an old plutocrat, now in decline, fated to pass on his wealth to a new, transformed society. It can only be useful for socialism to inherit the old man's wealth and experience. Still according to the Chinese Marxist determinism, the old man is no longer able to overturn or halt the historically inevitable advent of socialism.

The Soviet Union can subvert it, however. And here we have the "principal enemy." Precisely because it is in a position to manipulate the blessing of the first revolution, precisely because it is considered the center of world revolution, the model of future society, the Soviet Union can even halt the "inevitable historical process." Indeed, the Chinese are convinced that it is doing so, insofar as it subjects the communist movement and national revolutions to the "social imperialist strategy," which stems from that of the tsars, which is more dangerous because it strangles socialism in the name of socialism.

32

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

However simplistic this may seem, this is the theory behind the current Chinese "attitude" which Belinguer has essentially understood--albeit equally simplistically. What the PCI secretary general has not understood, or does not want to understand, however, is the fact that Moscow is treating Beijing in the same manner. That is to say, in the "attitude" of Soviet policy also, China is now regarded as an enemy. Indeed: the principal enemy. This definition has been given its due theoretical formulation, which was completed just recently, during the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. We have already reported on the volunteer corps that the Soviet Union was preparing for Vietnam in the countries of the so-called socialist community. An intricate ideological problem emerged while the soldiers were being trained. There was no explanation of why wars break out between communist countries. It was not merely a question of the ideological obsession characteristic of that movement. It was necessary also to explain why volunteers were needed to go and fight the Chinese.

The initial interpretations given by various parties did not coincide: the Hungarians, the Poles and the Germans continued to regard China as a country with a socialist structure, with deviations within the leadership, while the Soviets, the Bulgarians and the Czechoslovaks judged that it should be deprived of that definition. On account of the importance of the conflict and its duration, which was measurable on an "Asian time scale," Moscow found it essential to unite these judgments and to establish an ideological background to justify the opposition between the socialist community and the biggest nation in the world (which had itself until then been socialist). At first the issue was discussed by the Kremlin Politburo and then Brezhnev discussed it with all the allied leaders, summoned to Moscow one after the other. Last, the coordination among the principal party specialists at a series of meetings and the drafting of the unified formula on the nature of the Chinese state and society were entrusted to Boris Ponomarev. His labors produced a document which practically marks China's transfer from the socialist camp, or at least its outskirts, to the capitalist camp.

Here, then, is a summary of Ponomarev's complex ideological syllogism: "While some time ago it was still possible to talk about the Chinese leaders' tendency to manipulate the contradictions between the two world systems in their own favor, the situation is now changing...China, because of the class content of its policy, has changed into a link in the world capitalist system." According to Ponomarev, this change took place after Mao: "While under Mao Beijing's steps of rapprochement toward Washington could be regarded as on the same level as a political game, the present establishment of the China-U.S. bloc is no longer a tactical phenomenon, but a strategic one."

Consequently, Ponomarev says, Chinese strategy vis-a-vis the communist movement has also changed: "During the period of the cultural revolution the Beijing leaders held positions of enmity with respect to almost all countries of the world socialist system...now, however, a differentiated approach is becoming the basic principle of their relations with the socialist countries.... They are trying to exalt their independence and 'autonomy' and

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

pretend to be interested in 'individual experiences' and 'national characteristics.'" Still according to Ponomarev's complex ideological formulation, the aim is "to split the states of the world socialist system, to make them confront the USSR and to smash the unity of action of the communist countries and parties." Apart from the USSR, the main target of the Chinese attacks is Cuba, "it being the most serious obstacle along the road of Chinese hegemony in the area of 'national liberations.'" (According to Ponomarev, this is the aim of Beijing's demands for a "tougher Washington policy toward Havana.")

And this is the qualitative change in the ideological verdict: "A new situation has come about in international relations, in which China, while proclaiming itself socialist, is alining itself with the capitalist world." There was only one possible conclusion to the syllogism: "The determined and uncompromised struggle (indeed, Ponomarev notes that China has attenuated its attacks on some socialist countries "for treacherous tactical reasons") against Chinese theory and practice is an indissoluble part of the struggle against imperialism and capitalism.

So what is happening between Moscow and Beijing is exactly the same and exactly the opposite: each regards the other as its "principal enemy." China is trying to integrate itself into intercommunist relations and national revolutions in order to thwart Soviet control and domination. Moscow is doing everything in its power to prevent China's integration into the intercommunist dialectic by maintaining strict control over all relations and contacts. Any possible dialog with Beijing must be through Moscow, as is the case with Washington, for that matter. One must not be misled by the Kremlin's declared willingness to accept the Chinese offer of diplomatic negotiations. In the past Zhou met with Kosygin, Shelepin established contact with Beijing and Ilichev visited China twice a year: all without any result. This is part of the control game: the weakest part of any diplomacy has always been its absence.

At this point the complex triangular relationship acquires a curious aspect: The USSR seeks relations on a state-level with China, to obstruct it in the intercommunist field; the United States prefers to see China integrated into intercommunist disputes and seeks to regulate its government relations with Moscow. In the final analysis everyone is contesting the friendship and enmity of the emerging China, each trying to tailor them to its own requirements.

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.

CSO: 3104

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

ENEL PRESIDENT ENDORSES NATIONAL ENERGY CONFERENCE PROPOSAL

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 13 Apr 79 p 13

[Text] Rome: -- Francesco Corbellini, president of ENEL, was the first to welcome a proposal by Giorgio Benvenuto, which appeared in the columns of this newspaper last Tuesday, and called for a national conference on energy. Rereading that interview to the secretary-general of the UIL, he said: "The energy question is so important -- I do not hesitate to say that only the issue of terrorism worries us more today -- that everyone must make a real contribution to finding solutions. All of us must stand ready to take part in a broad debate on this issue, and refrain from empty polemics, as Benvenuto says, as if this were a religious war between the supporters and opponents of the nuclear option."

Benvenuto suggests that the conference, called by the government, lay the groundwork for a new national energy policy.

"The first basic condition is that any debate of this scope on a problem like energy not hamper, but rather facilitate quick and specific decisions. Clearly, then, we must not sit about and philosophize, seeking to place our discussion on too vast a time horizon; Benvenuto says that we must define an energy program for the next 20 years. I believe it would be better to aim at closer deadlines, say on the order of 12 years. The more you narrow down the time span, the more possible it becomes to talk about concrete facts. Why do I think it wisest to stop at a span of 12 years? Simply because if we go beyond that horizon we get into the realm of prophesy, where we are weighing hypotheses like producing fuel from grain, for instance, which in any case could become practical only over a long period of time. The energy crisis we are living through calls for steps to be taken promptly. Even the proposal to call a moratorium on construction of nuclear power plants in Italy, to which Benvenuto has given his support, but which in the CORRIERE interview he seems to be rethinking

35

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

to some extent, stems from a view of energy problems reaching into the year 2050. At the operational level, anybody who has specific responsibilities in this field is looking for immediate answers."

You therefore favor calling an energy conference, but under certain conditions. What are those conditions?

"First of all, that the problems involved in the production of electric power be dealt with separately. There is a real danger that we may simply generate confusion and even give credence to certain positions when we mix up all the energy-related factors together without weighing the specific importance of each one in relation to the nation's energy picture as a whole. Let's take conservation: we have to distinguish between the fraction of conservation which in the end is conservation of oil, aided perhaps by higher production of electric power, and the conservation that stems from energy consumption. Necessary increases in electric power, which are quite different from increases in energy as a whole, reflect a highly specific power of penetration."

What do you think the preparatory phase of this conference ought to cover so that it will make a practical contribution to the decisions the government will have to make?

"The conference must not get back into all the decisions that have already been made, even though they were made by Parliament, which is not an assembly of experts. The Energy Plan as approved by the legislature may be debatable on some counts, and there is certainly room for improvement; but on a great many points it is worth keeping. If we don't, we may well start going backward. On the other hand, I agree with Benvenuto that the conference really must have adequate preparation, perhaps a series of meetings devoted specifically to the issues to be discussed later on in the most concise possible way. ENEL is already at work on a series of meetings on the nation's hydroelectric resources, in which we are trying to quantify more accurately the contribution water can make to the solution of the energy crisis. For this reason, I believe that the conference cannot be planned for any earlier than September if, as Benvenuto says, our aim is to know exactly what everybody must do when it is over. ENEL will be right in there with its contribution, believing that in solving the nation's energy problems there is room for all our energy sources, and therefore for all suggestions that are backed up with solid scientific documentation."

COPYRIGHT: 1979 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.

6182
CSO: 3104

GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS DOMINATE NEW CABINET

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 15 Apr 79 pp 21-23

[Article: "New Government, Big Changes"]

[Text] Friday, 30 March, following Adolfo Suarez' swearing in before Parliament as the first prime minister of the constitutional government, began a week that was fraught with alarm and shock for the government party, the UCD [Union of Center Democrats].

This was to be followed by the long-awaited 3 April elections and the UCD's "noche triste" following the "red victory"--in the words of a former Madrid councilman--in the municipal elections which the socialist and communist candidates unquestionably and surprisingly won.

On Wednesday night the UCD was filled with trepidation: Suarez, holding a list of new cabinet members that was handwritten on a white sheet of paper with the letterhead "Government Prime Minister," called a meeting of the Council of Ministers. It was the high point of a frantic dance which included two types of dancers: The many who were called and the few who were chosen.

After a neurosis-filled month, Suarez apparently supported the guidelines which were to shape the selection of the new government. A government whose identity had been kept a more closely guarded secret than during Franco's heyday. For the first time during the democratic Spring, lists containing the names of prospective ministers began to flourish once more. It was easy to detect who was being ambitious and sending up trial balloons, who was motivated by impassioned self-interest, which rumors were orchestrated and who were the paid gossip mongers.

On Thursday, the 5th, at midnight, Suarez came down from Mount Sinai with the legal list of names. It contained the names of 21 ministers. Ten were new faces and almost all were young. The appointment of a civilian, Agustin Rodriguez Sahagun who was Minister of Industry in the previous Cabinet, as Defense Minister came as a surprise. It was the first time in 43 years that a civilian had been named to this post.

GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

But the surprises did not end there. A party "heavyweight," Finance Minister Fernandez Ordonez, leader of the social democratic sector, was not included in the new UCD government, thus confirming rumors that had circulated shortly before the crisis occurred.

Another prominent person who was missing from the list is Rodolfo Martin Villa, the legendary Minister of the Interior who asked not to be reappointed and refused, despite Suarez' insistence, to accept the post of Minister of Public Works and Urbanism. The vacancy at Interior was filled by Lieutenant General Ibanez Freire after Interior Undersecretary Sancho Rof refused to accept the "prize."

"M.L.? This is X. Listen, please accept my apologies, but I am up in the air. What do you know about the crisis?"

This past week a nominee called a political commentator and questioned him in the above manner...at 4 o'clock in the morning on a work day.

The poor timing was nothing more than a reflection of the state of anxiety that the most prominent UCD members went through for a month while waiting for the manna in the form of the appointments.

The state of temporary suspense was finally broken after a long period of silent meditation.

And the big surprise was the omission of Fernandez Ordonez, Minister of Finance in the previous Cabinet, who was responsible for fiscal reforms.

Prior to the 1 March elections, Fernandez Ordonez had made contact with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and these contacts were not well received by high-level UCD officials. It was even rumored that he was being considered as Minister of the Office of Prime Minister if it were necessary to form a UCD-PSOE coalition government in the event of a tie in the general elections.

However, all UCD government sources consulted by CAMBIO 16 were "certain" that Fernandez Ordonez would remain in the Cabinet. He was described as "irreplaceable" by a Cabinet minister.

Likewise, Abril Martorell told CAMBIO 16 that "I do not believe that Fernandez Ordonez will leave the government. His presence is almost mandatory at this time." But he was replaced, according to all our sources, because of his failure to reach a personal agreement with President Suarez.

Following a report that Fernandez Ordonez would not be included in the new Cabinet, the Spanish press began to speculate about a UCD's shift to the right" because it was their understanding that the CD's [Democratic Coalition] support of Suarez as prime minister and in some municipal districts would influence government policy, especially if the representative of the UCD's "most progressive" wing were not included in the new cabinet.

GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

However, Suarez offset the curse of a rightist image, even though he did remove Fernandez Ordonez, by selecting Ordonez' 'young turks,' four representatives from the Social Democratic wing agreed to serve on the Cabinet. They are Rafael Arias Salgado, Luis Gonzalez Seara, Carlos Bustos and Garcia Anoveros. Perez Llorca was also given a Cabinet post.

On Friday, 30 March, Suarez withstood many hours of the harshest verbal attack in Parliament since joining the government in 1976. Even the groups that supported his appointment, such as the CD and the PSA /Socialist Party of Andalusia/, were critical of the government's program read by Suarez and, they along with the other opposition groups, of the UCD's unilateral decision not to allow a discussion of the program beforehand.

"Black Friday"

Criticism ranged from Blas Pinar's prophetic revelation that the UCD would bring destruction to Spain to Carillo's statement that "Suarez' program will not withstand a debate."

Socialist Felipe Gonzalez, the harshest critic of all, recalled Suarez' speeches praising Franco when Suarez was UCD deputy secretary general. The person responsible for Adolfo Suarez' "Black Friday" was none other than, according to those questioned by CAMBIO 16, Fernando Abril Martorell, deputy prime minister and the person behind the idea of preventing a debate.

Landelino Lavilla, president of Parliament and a "tough" and intransigent man with the opposition, who with the bill in hand was responsible for "technically" preventing a debate, had earlier suggested that it would be a good idea to have a debate.

Another surprise appointment was that of Agustin Rodriguez Shagun as Minister of Defense. For the first time since 1936 a civilian was elevated to a Cabinet post traditionally reserved for a military man.

Not since Santiago Casares held the post in 1936 had something similar occurred. There were two reasons for the appointment. One was the strong opposition in some army quarters to Lieutenant General Gutierrez Mellado. The other was that Prime Minister Suarez has harbored for some time the idea of having a civilian in the Defense Ministry who, in addition, was a businessman and capable of negotiating. "What we are trying to do," a high government official said, "is to run the Army as though it were a large corporation." An idea which is behind the appointment of defense ministers in several European countries and the United States.

The nomination of Rodolfo Martin Villa as Public Works minister was another one of the surprises which the latest lists brought to the political class. However, when everyone thought that the appointment was a foregone conclusion, Martin Villa proved to be intransigent and firm and rejected the offer despite Suarez' pleas. So that the post went to a man who

GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

proved to be an even greater surprise: Sancho Rof whose awkwardness before TVE cameras during the municipal elections surprised everyone, including his closest coworkers.

Only the complex fabric of magnetic forces which inspire the various UCD factions--despite Suarez' denial that they do not exist--can explain Sancho Rof's appointment. Sancho Rof is a relatively obscure and unknown man with little political appeal for such a key job as Public Works which is of great importance in future government relations with local administrations that by and large are in the hands of the left.

Opus Dei is Ousted

The Minister of Culture, according to highly reliable sources, provoked serious clashes between the Christian Democratic wing of the UCD and Antonio Fontan, the Opus Dei's representative. "The 35 billion pesetas that are to be divided among the private schools," a former Cabinet minister told us, "turn the Ministry of Culture into an appetizing plum."

Finally, Suarez, after offering the post to Christian Democrat Oscar Alzaga who refused it, wisely decided to appoint Otero Novas to the post and Fontan to the Territorial Administration Ministry.

UCD and government leaders finally forcefully denied last Thursday that the government's policy would shift to the right as suggested by the absence of Fernandez Ordonez. "Our policy will be one of the center left," a high party official told us, "just as it has been in recent months. The UCD cannot deviate from the center left road."

However, other party sources feel that the center left position is not as radical as it appears. "Neither can the government move at a very fast pace," another UCD leader said, "because rapid change will lead to serious disagreements. In this country great care must be taken with the right."

The New Ministers: Who's Who

A full Social Democratic glass, tempered by a shot of Christian Democracy and a few drops of Opus Dei Angostura bitters are the ingredients of the government cocktail that Adolfo Suarez served to the nation last Thursday at the Moncloa Palace bar.

In any case, the mixture, according to political observers, will not be too explosive even though the new drink's main ingredient is the Social Democrats.

This includes Luis Gonzalez Seara, Pontevedra deputy and former government secretary for university affairs, who will fill the newly created Ministry of University Affairs and Research.

GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

A sociology teacher, Gonzalez Seara was dean of political science at Complutense, a member of the democratic opposition and a supporter of the "16" publications (CAMBIO 16, DIARIO 16 and HISTORIA 16) when they were going through difficult times.

Jaime Garcia Anoveros, LL.D from the University of Bologna Italy, and member of the Peruvian Institute of Tax Law, was appointed to the fiefdom of Paco Fernandez Ordonez--the big loser of "operation reshuffle"--the Finance Ministry.

His ties to private enterprise, through Abengoa, S.A., Montajes Electricos e Inmobiliaria Rustica and Urbana SAIRU, might provide him with the leftist credentials necessary to see to it that, slowly but surely, fiscal reform one day will reach safe harbor.

On the other hand, no one can guarantee the success of Jesus Sancho Rof, PhD in physics and former under secretary of the interior. "Sheriff" Rof, as CUI leader Alfonso Guerra calls him, will have the difficult task of running the Public Works Ministry where his predecessor, Joaquin Garrigues, did a tremendous, brilliant and quiet job.

An identical role awaits Opus Dei member Antonio Fontan Perez, former senate president, third UCD deputy from Madrid, who will have to contend with the highly sensitive issue of Basque and Catalanian autonomy from the relatively new Ministry for Regional Administration.

Fontan Perez, a teacher of Latin philology at Complutense, a journalist trained at the Madrid School and former director of the University of Navarra's School of Journalism, was the man who paved the way for a free press in Spain from his columns in MADRID, a newspaper which was first closed down and later bombed during the later years of the Franco administration. The "Silver Fox," Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, one of Suarez' right hand men in Parliament who was also the UCD's leader in Parliament, has been appointed to one of the post's that is closest to Moncloa Palace, to the building housing the "select few."

From there the 39 year old resident of Cadiz will run the Office of the Prime Minister. He was born into a wealthy family, studied law and diplomacy, belonged to the "Felipes" (Popular Liberation Front) in Madrid in his youth and later joined the Social Democrats.

Economy Minister Jose Luis Leal Maldonado has a similar background. He was born in Granada a year before Perez Llorca, studied law in Madrid, then specialized in economics and statistics in Geneva and Paris and he was a professor at the University of Natterre for 5 years. He is a Social Democrat who in Suarez' previous Cabinet held the post of government secretary for Economic Coordination and Planning and he plans all of the economic policies carried out by Fernando Abril.

GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

Carlos Bustelo is the new Minister of Industry. He is a 49 year old Social Democrat from Galicia, born in Ribadeo and has a law degree. In 1973 he was appointed financial director of Enagas and since July 1977 he has been under secretary in the Commerce and Tourism Ministry.

Lieutenant General Ibanez Freire has been given the thankless task of Interior Minister. He is well known as a law and order man.

And finally, there is another surprise. The Ministry of Health, after Luis Gamir's name was considered, was given to Otero Novas. However, the post finally went to Juan Rovira Tarazona. Sanchez de Leon is leaving the post, but his influence in Extremadura helped him to place in that ministry someone from his own group, AREX /Extremadura Regional Action Party/, to which Tarazona belongs.

8599
CSO: 3110

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COUNTRY SECTION

SPAIN

BRIEFS

NEW AIRCRAFT FOR NAVY--The Spanish Search and Rescue Service, which had ordered three maritime version F-27 twin turboprop engines from Fokker, has received the first of the three aircraft and has put it into operation. The remaining two are to be delivered very shortly. The Spanish Search and Rescue Service has decided to base the aircraft in Seville, Palma, and the Canary Islands. The maritime F-27's are equipped with Litton AN/APS-504 V-2 search radar which was designed specifically for detecting small craft on rough seas. [Text] [Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 24 Mar 79 p 41]

CSO: 3100

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY